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 3
 Introduction 
The purpose of this theory of truth is to supply the integrative theory of reality (Nörrek-
lit 1991, Nörreklit 2005, Henriksen et all. 2005, Nörreklit et. all. 2006) with a theory on 
the logical construction of truth and thus start building an epistemology adequate for 
the theory of reality. 
 
According to the integrative theory of reality the distinction between real and not real is 
a distinction within the complex relation between the actor and the world. That some-
thing is real means that the actor can function as actor. Unreal means that the actor is 
unable to construct a functioning relation to the world. An unreal world is spooky, it 
does not function as expected. It is impossible to make it work according to the inten-
tions of the actor. The future is totally unpredictable. 
 
The condition for functioning relation is that the factual, the values and the meaning or 
communication dimensions are integrated: There must be a factual ground. Otherwise 
the world is like a dream. The factual ground must open possibilities. Furthermore, val-
ues of the actor must lie within the range of the possibilities. Finally, this synthesis of 
facts, possibilities and values must be expressed in the meaning of our communication.  
 
The integration of meaning, facts, possibilities and values opens the reality of time to 
create the life world of the actor. The disintegration of these dimensions makes the real-
ity vapor away. If there are no possibilities, then one is dead. The possibilities must be 
grounded in the facts. Otherwise they are fictive. If the values are not within the possi-
bilities, the actor has neither reason nor motivation to act and may do nothing. Finally, 
if the integration of facts, possibilities and values is not embedded in the communica-
tion of the actor, the communication becomes useless and meaningless and unable to 
position the actor in the world. 
 
 
Expressed or expressible knowledge and truth are constructed integral parts of human 
life that vastly improve human practices. The condition of the improvement is that we 
possess a concept of truth that enables us to bridge not one but all the possible gaps be-
tween knowing and doing, such as the possible gaps between knowing and deciding, 
deciding and doing, starting to do and finishing the work, and finishing the work and 
reaching the goal (Searle 2001). If these gaps cannot be bridged, then theoretical 
knowledge, knowing that, as well as knowledge as known truth, is irrelevant to prac-
tice.  
 
However, knowledge is obviously not irrelevant. Scientific technology works. Within 
the humanities and social sciences we are able to organize a highly complex human life. 
Thus the gaps are not only bridgeable, they have to a large extend been somehow 
bridged.  
 
Nevertheless, the resulting world is not without problems. And the problems seem in-
creasingly due to the ways we have chosen to solve the problems of bridging the gaps. 
There are serious flaws: poverty, wars, deceases, stress, mental deceases, drug prob-
lems and so on. There are still flaws and limits in our ability to bridge the gaps. We 
need to hunt problems in our ways to bridge the gaps. 
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According to the main argument of pragmatic constructivism, a functioning reality is 
constructed by integrating the four dimensions constituting reality, i.e. the factual, the 
logical, value and the communicative dimension. The overcoming of the gab between 
knowledge and doing must therefore be achieved by the practical integration of these 
dimensions. And, there will exist a knowledge-doing gap as long as these dimensions 
are not adequately integrated in our knowledge. This leads to the idea that what we 
need is an integrated theory of truth that is able to handle integration in the dark, so to 
say, to create the light of bridging knowledge. Traditional theories of truth seem basi-
cally to relate to one or two dimensional substructures of reality only. They concern an 
abstract world, which presupposes integration of additional dimensions. 
 
The basic traditional theories of truth – such as correspondence, coherence, phenome-
nological, hermeneutic and pragmatic theories of truth - inform us about different as-
pects in the problem of truth. None of them can stand by itself. They all presuppose 
each other. We need an integrated theory of truth. Correspondence concerns the factual 
dimension. Coherence concerns the logical aspect that is the foundation for the con-
struction of possibilities. The phenomenological theory concerns the uncovering of the 
hidden as well as the withholding of subjective pre-judgments which is essential for 
subjective as well as objective aspects of the world to reveal themselves to us. Interpre-
tation (hermeneutics) is necessary in order to let language and communication comprise 
the integration of factual, logical and subjective aspects. All theories tell something im-
portant and necessary. 
 
 
How integration works cannot be demonstrated a priori because a priori demonstrations 
presuppose tools that already embed an integration of the factual and the logical. Thus 
integration depends on historical conditions – cultural, legal and technological. Thus it 
must be learned through practice. This learning is brought about by the pragmatics of 
truth: If our activities do lead to intended results, then the interpretations used are es-
sentially true – there is no essential gap between understanding and reality. If activities 
do not fulfill the suggested expectations, then one must improve understanding of real-
ity, i.e. of the operating integration. 
 
The strategy of the article is as follows:  The first part consists of four steps which are 
used to establish a concept of pro-active truth by combining phenomenological, ration-
alist and positivist perspectives on truth. The second part first establishes the concept of 
pragmatic truth (step five) which is considered the real truth, although it is useless in it-
self because it is an ex post perspective and not ex ante. In step 6, the pro-active and the 
pragmatic truth are integrated and used to form the basis of a learning ideal of truth. 
The third part, step 7, analyzes the performatory problem that pro-active truth state-
ments are speech acts that at least in a social setting are likely to influence the prag-
matic outcome thereby influencing their own truth value leaving us in the dark with re-
spect to the truth without proper precautions.  
 
The purpose of this article is thus not to clarify the meaning of the notion of truth. It is 
not to work out a detailed version of the one or the other truth theory. The purpose is to 
create a logical guidance to the construction of truth by unfolding the understanding of 
truth that is hinted at in the various theories of truth to comprehensive structure of the 
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complexity involved in establishing the difference between valid truth and falsity. This 
result is outlined in the logical steps below involved in the construction of truth.1  
 
Part 1: Pro-active truth 
 Step 1, phenomenology of truth, uncovering: Careful observation and 
study of reality as phenomena, as experienced life world lays the 
ground for the construction of truth. Uncovering, laying things in the 
open, uses a variety of observation methods. It is highly interactive. 
The phenomenon studied shows itself in many ways.  
In a scientific context it results in the creation of a data basis that con-
stitute the epistemic platform for theoretical analysis. 
 
 Step 2, grounding a model by factual correspondence: Out of this ma-
terial reality as a model is constructed by means of abstraction: the 
phenomena are conceptualized in a language system. When the model 
is internally logically coherent, we have a framework with which one 
can analyze the reality.  
 
 Step 3, grounding the model by institutional coherence: By testing the 
model for external coherence with the institutional conditions – legal 
conditions or other – of society we analyze the logical possibilities of 
the modeled part of reality to function in the institutional environment. 
 
 Step 4, creating pro-active truth by correspondence and coherence: 
By operationalizing and dimensionalization of the concepts of the real-
ity model we create an intersubjective information and control system, 
with which one can capture and communicate the situation of the real-
ity as well as establish control over the reality / life world. Now corre-
spondence between the model and phenomena can be studied, relevant 
points for measurements can be defined and measurement tools be cre-
ated, and one can start working with the model and generate state-
ments about the reality. These statements aim at expressing what here 
is called pro-active truth. 
 
Part 2: pragmatic truth and learning ideal 
 Step 5, pragmatics of truth: The results of the activities show to what 
degree the reality model expresses the reality itself. The real truth de-
pends on the outcome of the endeavors and may therefore differ from 
the pro-active truth. 
 
 Step 6, learning ideal: Hereby the learning perspective becomes the 
objective of the installation of observation and monitoring systems. 
Any observed deviation is information about truth difference, i.e. the 
difference between the reality and observation. Such observation 
should lead to analysis of the monitoring system in order to improve 
the system. The dynamics of the world will always tend to make pro-
                                                 
1 The distinction between the variety of truth criteria and the meaning of truth is in “Sandhed som korre-
spondens mellem, udsagn og virkelighed” (Nörreklit 1969), where various truth theories were considered 
complementary criteria of truth. 
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active truth and real truth drift apart. The implemented learning proc-
ess counters this problem. 
 
Part 3: Performatory problems 
 Step 7, performatory problems: Finally we consider a problem related 
to the speech act theory of truth. This problem is reduced by the ability 
to establish knowledge of the expectations and learning about how the 
pro-active truth statements effect the expectations. 
 
In the following these steps are explained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1. Pro-active truth 
Step 1. The observational ground – reality as phenomenon 
Truth about reality is based on observation. The observational basis must be compre-
hensive. Poor, inadequate and insufficient observational knowledge leads to poor 
knowledge. Establishing a solid observational ground is a primary task in truth finding. 
 
The reality of life world determines how it functions in its environment. It is not 
enough to monitor the life world. One must understand its very reality, i.e. the dynam-
ics of how things function in order to distinguish the apparent from the real in the world 
we live in, in our life world.  
 
Observation must be guided by a critical scientific reflection. To understand reality 
needs more than observing the phenomena of the world with open eyes. It is to uncover, 
what is going on. It is to reveal reality as an experienced life world. It is to uncover 
what is going on. This way of observing is interactive. It experiments, it questions - it is 
an ongoing dialogue with questions and answers between the observer and the observed 
world. This careful study reveals the dynamics of the world including, for instance, un-
derstanding and misunderstanding of people, suppressed observations, integrated and 
not-integrated motivations and values, conflicts between groups, the level of knowledge 
and skills and so on. It reveals and lays open the technological functioning of things as 
well as the social organization as phenomena.  
 
As a phenomenon reality is in itself infinitely complex. What interests us is the func-
tioning of our life world in relation to its environment. The theory of reality as integra-
tion of fact, logic, value and communication/meaning guides our observations  to ob-
serve the knowledge of facts, of possibilities, and of values and their integration in the 
communication in this life world as being essential for understanding the phenomena as 
an expression of real functioning reality and not just observing some form of epiphe-
nomena. 
 
The methodology to observe the life world phenomena (Brentano 1930), and the un-
covering (Heidegger 1930) what is going on, is broadly speaking phenomenological in 
nature and guided by the idea of truth as uncovering and laying things in the open. The 
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observer must go directly to the world he wants to know the truth about. ‘To the things 
themselves’, is the motto. In this context, truth is not a question of correspondence be-
tween on the one hand some linguistic entities such as statements and reports and on the 
other hand facts. Truth is about uncovering the world - including its language. At this 
stage, where the observing truth seeker confronts the infinitively complexity of the 
world, a language to analyze this complexity, a language in which to systematically es-
tablish and express facts about this phenomenon, is not yet the relevant issue, although 
the language of the observer may influence his observation. The relevant issue is that 
there is no in between the phenomenon and the observer. Truth is not represented, it is 
revealed. 
 
Language is always very limited in vocabulary compared to the infinity of the complex-
ity of the phenomena. Thus language is essentially reductive. Such reductions should 
only be made based on proper insight in the phenomena. In the process of uncovering 
the life world of the actors and the organization, the observer acquires a complexity of 
knowledge, information and data that will help him in setting up a relevant conceptual 
system for observation of facts and exerting influence and control. 
 
Values are subjective and liable to be protected, covered and hidden under pressure. 
Naturally it may be complicated to uncover and establish credible insights in sensitive 
subjective phenomena such as subjective values. These insights are important though, 
because irrespective whether they are covered or uncovered they operate and exert con-
tinuous influence. In order to understand what is going on, it is necessary to uncover the 
subjective values operating. The dimension of value - the values of the actors and the 
organization must be uncovered.  
 
Often leadership focuses on externally defined goals and mistakenly considers them to 
be the operating values. Externally defined goals must be internalized in order to be op-
erating values. This mistake often amounts to mistake the dimension of possibility/logic 
with the value dimension. The effect of this mistake is that the organization or institu-
tion does not by itself set it values, but simply tries to realize external goals only. This 
poor form of value orientation creates weaknesses in the interaction with actors and 
parties and causes difficulties in creating a convincing profile of the organizational 
work.  
 
In some competitive or criminal environments the phenomenological step is often used 
to avoid establishing the truth in order to manipulate the outcome to make them fit with 
the interests. By analyzing, where interest of their competitors score high or low, the 
parties become able to choose the criteria for information so that the subsequent infor-
mation furthers their interests rather reflecting any real truth about the subject.2  
 
The openness in the investigation is the so called phenomenological epoché (Husserl 
1900). According to Habermas (Habermas 1999) it is a context where there is no domi-
nating power, i.e. a context created by the confidentiality and the absence of use of 
power in the investigation. The openness combined with a sense of the social atmos-
phere, stress and tensions combined with the use of dialogues and other interactive pro-
cedures enables the observer to recognize and analyze how the forces and values of the 
                                                 
2 Compare: One still quotes Churchill for saying: “Don’t trust any statistics you did not fake yourself,” 
although Churchill never said this. On the contrary, it was systematically attributed to Churchill by 
Goebbels in speeches in 1940 in order to discredit him. We still follow Goebbels portrait of Churchill, 
thinking that this was very clever of Churchill. 
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different elements and parties are observed, respected and integrated in the functioning 
of organized life and whether the organization itself is seen as a unit representing clear 
values (cf. Prangsgaard et.all. 1983, Nörreklit 2006). 
 
Summary: 
 
Philosophy of truth Results Methods 
Phenomenology: 
- Uncovering phenomena 
as they are, 
- To the things them-
selves 
Knowledge of reality as phe-
nomena, life world: 
- Things are laid open 
- Infinite complexity 
- Visibility of subjective ele-
ments 
Open inquiry: 
- Triangulation 
- Critical epoché 
- Penetrating dialogues 
- Sharp observations 
- Careful scrutinizing 
 
 
Data – the epistemic platform 
In a scientific context the step from observation to the step of creating a conceptual 
model is facilitated through creating collections of observational data that provide an 
epistemic platform for careful selection and development of the concepts to be included 
in the model. In pre-scientific contexts it is simply our memory and bodily knowledge 
that constitutes this platform as a more or less intuitive and unconscious knowledge for 
our reflection. 
 
The role of the platform is to establish a transition in status form being an observed 
phenomenon to being an established fact by means of a stable in between observer and 
things or phenomena. In a pre-scientific world such transition is replaced by the reality 
of the practice itself – this reality guarantees that the foundation is factual and not 
purely subjective observations. In pre-practice types of contexts such as experimenta-
tion, reflection, investigation where new practices are in the making, this guarantee 
must be established by special procedures.  There scientific procedures of data collec-
tion, tracing of data, triangulation etc. play the role of establishing the observations as 
facts. Facts are not special types of phenomena. Facts are phenomena that have obtain a 
special reliable status. In this sense facts are social constructs. On the other hand, facts 
are also things in themselves. The chair I sit on exists independently of me or any other 
people. The chair is not a social construct. It is primarily a physical construct although 
made for a social use. But that it is a fact that there is a chair that is a real social con-
struct. 
This feature is then integrated in the forms of practices that base themselves on scien-
tific studies. 
 
The facts established on the platform are in themselves an immense reduction com-
pared to the infinity of the phenomenal ground out of which it is constructed. We can-
not record everything we observe. Nevertheless the data represent reality to the scien-
tist. The poorer this selection of data as a representation of reality is, the poorer the re-
sulting scientific truth as representation of the reality of the phenomena is likely to be. 
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Step 2. Coherence and the world as a model 
The second step concerns considering the world as a real model and to create a coherent 
theoretical model of the world. The focus on logical coherence is a focus on identifying 
the range of possibilities. The important use of logic is to assist in identifying that 
which is possible rather than to identify the necessary.  
 
According to the coherence theory truth is a holistic or structural matter. Statements 
cannot stand alone. They only have meaning in the overall linguistic context. Thus, a 
statement is never true or false just by itself. If a statement is true, then a great many 
other statements are true too, and similarly it is never false by itself – if a statement is 
false, then a great number of other statements are false too. Thus truth comes in sets of 
statements. Not in individual statements. When we test an individual statement, say 
“the sun is shining (here now)” it appears that we are testing the one statement, and that 
all other statements are irrelevant. But that is not the case. Say: I look up the sky and 
claim, that I see the sun shining. Suppose, it is midnight. That it is dark outside. The 
street lamps and all the lights in the windows are shining. Now in this situation to say, 
“the sun is shining” suddenly is very little convincing. What makes the truth is what 
generates the greatest coherence. And in this case, the statement that the sun is shining 
creates very little coherence no matter whether I think I saw it or not. We will conclude 
I saw something else. 
 
In stead implementing a theoretical model given a priori, one may create a reality 
model of the world studied based on abstraction from the phenomenological material 
much in the manner of grounded theory  (for instance as described by Strauss & Cor-
bin, 1990). In scientific contexts the model is based on the data of the epistemic plat-
form thereby ensuring that the model is based on facts. At this stage we develop reality 
as a model of what is going on in the life world. This model functions as a basis for a 
structured communication about the nature of the reality in question. A model that is 
not carefully grounded will miss essential aspects of reality – i.e. aspects that are im-
portant because of their influence on the workings and dynamics of the life world. 
 
One must distinguish between phenomena as say passive appearances is an impression 
or vision obtained by observation on a deeper level phenomena as force, power or dy-
namics obtained by experience in interactive studies. Thus the deeper level is not – as 
in realistic models – something principally unobservable that only can be deduced by 
some rather metaphysical inference, but discloses itself as phenomenon in interactive 
studies. By recognizing the inter-active nature of recognition one can create models and 
theories for the dynamics of the world without engaging in the metaphysical specula-
tion which reference to realist models enforce. 
 
The model must then be developed and analyzed for internal coherence. For that to be 
done it must be transformed into a set of theoretical statements – a theory. As long as 
the relations of a model are open and undetermined, test for coherency makes no sense. 
Test for coherence as for truth only makes sense if the indeterminate relations of the 
model are replaced with propositions or hypotheses about these relations. The imagina-
tion of some undetermined relations between the elements in a model cannot be tested 
before they are thus specified. The model becomes a theory through such specification 
of the relations of the model, and the theory must be logically coherent and empirically 
true. 
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The analysis of coherency draws on theoretical techniques from theories and methods 
of in logic and argumentation and the result is a refined theoretical model. 
 
The process of creating concepts by abstraction and to saturate these concepts though 
theoretical sampling (Straus & Corbin 1990) creates a rich language with which one 
can describe the social actor (actor, organization, business etc.) and its situation. How-
ever, the phenomenal ground is always infinitively more complex to be expressed in 
any model. One and the same ground can be described from infinitely many different 
perspectives. All these perspectives are true as passive abstract images of the phenome-
nal world, although they are not equally relevant to understanding its dynamics, i.e. 
they are not generating equally valid forms of truth. The interactive observations help 
the observer to identify dynamics and operating forces, however, the observations will 
be open to a variety of interpretations. Thus to enable validity concerning statements of 
the dynamics, one needs a learning process through which one can identify the theories 
that capture the real dynamics of the world – i.e. it captures the dynamics in a way that 
is decisive to the ability to function and realize plans and expectations. This is the task 
of the following steps that guide us to come from model to truth. 
 
Thus, at this reality model level, the theoretical model describes existing life world and 
some of its dynamics. However, the validity of the dynamics of this reality cannot be 
analyzed by these means yet. In order to do this one must create coherence, i.e. a con-
ceptual dynamics in the model by embedding the actor/organization in its environment 
(step 3) and developing criteria and measurements that enable the observer to replace 
subjective impression of change with functional observations that can be analyzed and 
improved (step 4). 
 
Summary: 
 
Philosophy 
of truth 
Results Methods 
Rationalism 
Systems 
theory / Co-
herence 
theory of 
truth 
Creating a model, a con-
ceptual structure  -  cre-
ating statements and 
theory - All dimensions 
integrated - Intersubjec-
tive communication 
model 
Logical analysis – Ab-
straction, - theoretical 
sampling - logical 
analysis - theoretical 
perspectives as meta-
theories  
 
 
Step 3. Institutional and environmental coherence – reality as a social 
construct3
The third step considers reality as a social construction. The theoretical as well as the 
practical models must externally cohere with (be isomorphic with) the institutional 
framework, and this framework must itself be internally coherent. 
 
                                                 
3 Although concepts of social reality are extensively analyzed it is seems uncommon to consider the insti-
tutional framework as a special set of truth conditions. The idea is due to Hanne Nörreklit. 
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Propositions always operate within a linguistic institutional environment. The institu-
tions of society constitute the framework for creating social facts. The theoretical mod-
els, propositions and perspectives created in step 2 always relate to such environment in 
a more or less direct manner. The work in step 2 is based on an institutionalized con-
ceptual framework. In the environment of modernity and globalization the framework 
includes not only the constitution of financial instruments, of property rights and func-
tioning markets but also the basis for integration and intercultural learning. In other 
types of societies the institutional frameworks are different, and organizations are run 
according to different principles.  
 
The globalized framework of modernity functions as a set of conditions for social-
economic success, with which any organization must cohere. This institutional frame-
work is on the one hand a condition for creating any reliable social facts at all. Since it 
holds for all organized work in the societies, it also defines the conditions of the com-
petitive environment of the organization. The condition for survival and success is the 
ability of the organization to mirror and adapt to this institutional and environmental 
framework. This we call institutional or external coherence meaning that the model of 
the operating social actor must not only be internally coherent but also coherent with 
the institutional conditions. On the other hand, there is a risk that the framework is in-
coherent in that the global ambition implements conditions that are counterproductive 
and invalid. 
 
Thus there are three sets of relations that must cohere internally as well as match exter-
nally or be isomorphic. The operations of the social actor, its inner logic, must match 
the logic of the constitutive institutions of society otherwise the social actor functions 
badly in society. Further, these systems should match theoretical modeling otherwise 
there is a theory-practice gap.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
Practice – concrete 
operating models 
Theoretical 
 model 
Institutional 
framework / laws, 
regulations 
All three models must be internally coherent as well as isomorphic and express the same structure. 
If practice does not reflect the institutional framework, it is in conflict with its society. Relation 
between practice and institutional framework is part of the theoretical analysis. Thus, theory is not 
only reflecting the coherency of practice and the institutional framework, but may itself influence 
these. 
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These three systems have some degree of isomorphism and should therefore in princi-
ple be able to apply to the same set of factual foundations. There is, however a differ-
ence in degree of generality. The theoretical system is purely logical and should fit any 
situation. The institutional framework depends on the nature of the organization and 
work, and is generally much narrower than the theoretical framework. That is the rea-
son why theories can be applied to improve or modify the institutional framework. The 
institutional frameworks differ according to traditions and ideologies. The company 
mirrors the relatively general conditions set by the institutional framework to create a 
specific model for its functioning. This model is lively and always changing but main-
tains its isomorphism with the institutional and the theoretical systems as long as it 
functions satisfactory. 
 
Summary: 
 
Philosophy of truth Results Methods 
Social constructiv-
ism: Coherence 
theory of truth 
Reality as social fact External coherence with 
constitutive rules 
 
 
 
Step 4. Correspondence, control and pro-active truth 
The fourth step considers practice as a controllable unit and is concerned with establish-
ing correspondence between theory and practice and integrating truth in our control of 
activities. Since at this level we have not yet a model that generates valid truth about 
the dynamics of reality, the truth we generate is called pro-active. 
 
Correspondence is an intuitive appealing concept of truth. If the world is in the way it is 
stated in the statement, then it is true; if not then it is false. Thus correspondence oper-
ates with a difference between a medium that can express reality in a true or false way - 
say a linguistic medium by which we create true or false sentences or propositions or 
say a mental medium by with we create true or false thoughts or ideas. Propositions or 
thought etc. are true if the world is as they claim it to be. That is correspondence. If the 
world is different than expressed in the proposition etc. then there is no correspondence. 
 
A problem in the correspondence theory is, that there must be some image or vision 
that corresponds to a reality. Correspondence cannot mean that say some group of signs 
point at some things in the world. There must be some content or structure – otherwise 
one cannot establish a difference between truth and falsity. This means that the corre-
spondence theory cannot stay alone. It must be supplemented with a different theory of 
truth, that enables us to create the linguistic or mental content, that can correspond to 
reality or not – which leads us back to the coherence theory.   
 
Nevertheless, correspondence is necessary. We do look at the world in order to find out, 
whether a statement is true or not. In order to establish correspondence between the 
theoretical model and the phenomenal world, the concepts of the theoretical model 
must be operationalized, observations points must be defined and measurement tools 
created. When this is done, the model can be used to describe facts and factual change 
and indicate possible dynamic structures and causal relations. Now a system connecting 
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the elements of the dynamic life world with social, technological and economic per-
spectives is in place, and leadership and management can analyze the situation, make 
decisions and create plans according to the various forms of goals and operate success-
fully in the environment. The statements resulting from this system claim to be true, re-
alizing the demands from phenomenology, coherence/logic as well as correspondence. 
The system set up in this way generates a pro-active truth. 
 
Correspondence in a scientific context is not a relation between statement and reality 
only, but a relation that involves the data on the epistemic platform. Thus there are two 
relations involved in correspondence: the operationalization connecting theoretical con-
cepts with data and the relation between data and the phenomenal reality. If people just 
look at the relation between data and general theoretical statements, one may be with-
out contact with reality. It is often tempting to generalize available data and then feel to 
be in control. It is however an illusion, unless the data are properly grounded and the 
concepts properly operationalized. Here there are often problems that then lead leaders 
or managers to run the unit in an ineffective way. 
 
 
Summary: 
 
Philosophy of 
truth 
Results Methods 
Empiricism / 
Correspon-
dence theory 
of truth 
Reality as controllable 
units 
All dimensions inte-
grated 
Pro-active truth 
Operationalization 
Dimensionalization – 
then: 
Data generated by the 
system 
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 Part 2. Pragmatic truth 
 
Step 5. Pragmatics of truth – life world as reality 
According to the pragmatic theory of truth, a statement is true if and only if it functions, 
i.e. if activities based on the statement lead to success and create the intended results. 
Pro-active truth is in itself no guarantee of any results. However, real truth depends on 
the ability to match future, real truth is pragmatic. Any statement may be interpreted as 
giving information about possible outcome of activities. The statement is true, if the ac-
tivities based on the statement actually lead to the results predicted in the statement. For 
instance “it is raining” implies that I get wet, if I go out without protection. Statements 
that have no practical consequences have no meaning.  
 
The problem with the pragmatic theory of truth in this traditional form above is that it – 
contrary to the pragmatic intension – cannot be used at all without introducing a differ-
ent concept of truth.  
 
First, it can only be used retrospectively. Pragmatic truth is a form of prediction. A 
statement is not true here and now. It must wait to become true. If a statement was true 
here and now, then that would mean that the statement was true because of some condi-
tions that take place here and now. These conditions may be correspondence or coher-
ence, but they cannot be the future results. 
Therefore one cannot know a pragmatic truth before the future has arrived so that one 
can check whether the prediction is fulfilled or not. One cannot a priori know the truth 
about the future. And this is – contrary to the very intention of the pragmatic theory - of 
no help in managing practice. Practice wants to know the truth before one acts upon it.  
 
However, when the future has arrived, then again the truth claim is about the future re-
sults of possible actions as is any truth claim in the pragmatic theory. It does not help to 
wait for the future to arrive, because the problem reappears. It s an infinite regress. Say: 
“it is raining (outside, here and now)”. The statements claims, that “if we go outside we 
will get wet if we have no proper protection such as an umbrella.” To check this out, we 
go outside without any protection and stand in the middle of the rain. Now we get wet. 
But can we know the truth about this according to the pragmatic theory of truth? To 
know whether it is true that “we get wet” (or more correctly “if we go outside we will 
get wet if we have no proper protection such as an umbrella”) we have to test the impli-
cations of these statements. According to the pragmatic theory it has a number of con-
sequences for our activities, for instance, to get wet means that if I go inside, then I will 
make things, I touch, wet. If I cannot make things wet by touching them or by my hair 
touching them or my cloth touching them, then I am not wet. Thus: I went out in the 
rain to test whether it was true that it rained, and now I must go inside again in order to 
make a new test in order to find out whether my first test gave a positive or negative re-
sult. And so on ad infinitum. The regress can only be stopped by the introduction of a 
different theory of truth. For instance: I go out and recognize that I get wet – I am 
standing in the rain. Here I went to the things themselves and used a phenomenological 
idea of truth to establish the pragmatic truth. 
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Therefore first of all, an independent source of truth not depending on knowledge about 
the future but fulfilling the conditions of constructivist pragmatism is needed. This is 
the system to generate pro-active truth described in the steps 1-4.  
 
Summary: 
 
Philosophy of 
truth 
Results Methods 
Pragmatism / 
Pragmatic the-
ory of truth 
Actor/organization as real 
unit 
Real truth 
Analysis of the 
truth difference - 
Expectations 
compared with re-
sults 
 
 
Step 6. Learning to validate, integrate and create reality 
Constructivist pragmatism is pragmatic in this sense. In order to develop a useful con-
cept of truth, constructivist pragmatism connects to future results as demanded by the 
pragmatic theory by claiming the fulfillment of a set of present conditions, namely the 
integration of the four dimensions of fact, logic, value and communication.  
 
The truth concept needed to supplement pragmatic truth is the pro-active truth de-
scribed. The concept of pro-active truth intends to create an idea of truth that looks into 
the future based on the present conditions. The pragmatic understanding of truth en-
ables us to compare the difference – call it the truth-difference - between the pro-active 
prediction and the pragmatic result. Thus there is a continuous learning situation 
through which the validity of truth system and the truth claims continuously improve. 
 
This is not invalidated by the fact that the pragmatically realized result again is to be 
expressed by a proactive truth. What is compared in the truth-difference is the pro-
active truth predicting the results before action and the pro-active judgment of the 
achieved action results. Pragmatic truth is the ability to keep the truth-difference within 
such limits that actions have results. 
 
Validity is constructed and maintained by establishing an ongoing learning process that 
enables testing for validity of the dynamic aspects as they are expressed in the theoreti-
cal model applied, finding flaws and improving the system. The successful integration 
is by its very definition an integration that enables the company to construct a future. 
 
Depending on the quality of operationalization (step 4) one can observe the ability to 
create realizable plans and predict events with sufficient precision that enables the 
study of the degree to which pro-active truth matches the real truth, i.e. to which the 
outcome of the activities match the expected or planned results. The observation and 
analysis of the truth difference, i.e. the difference between the expected pro-active and 
the realized pragmatic truth should be the vehicle of a system of learning that con-
stantly enables us to create better pro-active truth and thereby to make better predic-
tions and decisions. Learning is the result of systematic analysis to identify and over-
come the causes that create the observed truth difference. The learning analysis must 
look for the reason for deviation in all the steps we have presented. The measurements 
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may be misleading, the understanding of the institutional framework may be unsatisfac-
tory, there may be hidden incoherencies, the abstractions may be too narrow or the phe-
nomenological basis may be poor and misleading for instance because it was manipu-
lated, sloppy or because some new type of phenomena have occurred unnoticed. As a 
result of the analysis the system generating the truth difference may be revised. The re-
vision may concern the proactive aspects. Or they may concern the way the pragmatic 
truth is worked out. Or it may concern the way the two are compared. In any case, it 
should explain and resolve the truth difference. 
 
The learning process is necessary. This process differs however from Poppers idea of 
learning by creating bold hypotheses and trying to falsify them.4 Based on the pro-
acting system, the company creates expectations and predictions – often these predic-
tions are safe, but sometimes they are bold, as Popper recommends in his so called 
critical rationalism. But here we do not learn through attempts to falsify the predictions. 
The company learns from the marginal deviations. Falsification attempts would gener-
ally be disastrous. Learning must take place before falsification occurs. Learning in 
practice takes place in relation to any truth difference, any deviation. Attempts to learn 
by falsification only works where general laws are tested in experimental situations, in 
statistical studies or in analyzing prototypes. When working with live cases where the 
pragmatics of truth is essential, error elimination is attempted falsification. 
This implies, however, that survival depends on creating sufficient margin so that one 
can survive some degree of deviation, otherwise no learning is possible, and if learning 
is impossible, the troubles of the firm will start to accumulate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Various conheren-
cies
 
Pro-active 
truth 
now future
Intern + extern 
coherencies 
Phenomeno- 
logical 
Correspon-
dence 
Data on plat-
form 
Pragmatic 
truth 
Truth-difference
Learning / 
validation 
timeline
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Cf. Popper 1973.  
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Summary: 
 
Philosophy of 
truth 
Results Methods 
Constructivist 
pragmatism - In-
tegrating theory 
of truth 
On going learning assimi-
lation of pro-active truth 
to real truth 
Leaning to reduce 
the truth difference 
between proactive 
and real truth 
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 Part 3. Truth as Speech Act5
 
The problem 
A pro-active truth proposition, report, or evaluation influences the social reality in 
which it is stated. This is even more the case, if it is presented within the world, which 
it purports to characterize. If for instance it is an evaluation, then it immediately influ-
ences the evaluated unit, when it is presented in this unit. Thus, as soon as it is known, 
then it causes effects that may imply that if it is or rather was true before it was stated, 
then it is not true anymore after it is stated.  
 
This is a general truth problem in relation to social constructs which one must consider 
especially in a modern environment, where institutions and governments constantly call 
for such evaluations to take place. 
 
Step 7. The solution  
When making an evaluation one can also analyze the expectations to the performance 
of the unit. By comparing the expectations with the actually realized results, one can to 
some degree predict the effect of the evaluation. If results are better than expected, the 
value will increase, and vice versa. This can therefore be taken into account in the 
evaluation report. 
 
Here one can introduce concepts to analyze certain kinds of fraud such as fraud by ex-
pectation control. If the performance is expected to be say ‘catastrophically’ low, then 
leadership and interested parties might be interested in hiding this situation for a period 
in order to rearrange things, for instance empty the unit for values before it is finally 
closed down.  
 
Physical versus social facts and truth 
Every investigation is an activity that interferes with the object it is studying - compare 
for instance Bohr's principle of complementarity. This does not hold true for the study 
of social facts only, but for physical facts as well. 
 
Consequently, there is in every type of study an element of indeterminateness where no 
truth can be established. This problem differs from the problem that uttering the truth 
and making it known is a speech act which affects the situation and especially that the 
uttering of the truth may make it false. This problem relates to the effect the informa-
tion about the truth has on the actors, if it differs from the actors expectations. The 
complementarity problem relates to the interactive nature of any investigation of any 
system. 
                                                 
5 J. L. Austin advocated the performatory theory of truth. See Krikham 1992.  
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